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MORGAN v ILLINOIS
112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Derrick Morgan was convicted in Cook County, Illinois, of the first
degree murder of a narcotics dealer (murder for hire) and sentenced to
death.
In Illinois, as in Virginia, a capital offense trial is conducted in two
phases, with the same jury that determines guilt also determining
whether the death penalty should be imposed. During the voir dire
conducted by the trial court, the State requested that the court question
prospective jurors as to whether they would automatically vote against
the death penalty regardless of the facts of the case, relying on Witherspoon
v. Illinois.l The court granted the State's request and asked each
prospective juror the Witherspoon question. In response to such ques-
tioning and over opposition from the defense, seventeen jurors were
excused when they expressed substantial doubt about their ability to
follow the law concerning the imposition of the death penalty.
After seven members of the first venire had been questioned,
defense counsel requested that the court ask prospective jurors a "re-
verse-Witherspoon" or life-qualifying question: "If you found Derrick
Morganguilty, would you automatically vote to impose thedeath penalty
no matter what the facts are?" The court denied Morgan's request, stating
that the same information was being sought through more general
questions, such as, "Would you follow my instructions on the law, even
though you may not agree?" While not all of the jurors were asked this
question, all of the jurors who eventually were impaneled were ques-
tioned generally about their ability to be fair and impartial.
After his conviction, Morgan appealed, citing Ross v. Oklahoma2
for the proposition that voir dire "must include the 'life qualifying' or
'reverse-Witherspoon' question upon request." The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed Morgan's conviction, finding that a trial court is not
required to include the reverse-Witherspoon or life-qualifying question
upon request of counsel. 3 In so doing, the court rejected the Ross v.
Oklahoma argument, finding that Morgan's jury "was selected from a
fair cross-section of the community, [that] each juror swore to uphold the
law regardless of his or her personal feelings, and [that] no juror
expressed any views that would call his or her impartiality into ques-
tion."4
Morgan appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the
reverse-Witherspoon issue.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court, citing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment guarantees of an impartial and indifferent jury.5 The
Court noted that a juror who would automatically vote for the death
1 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
2 Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988). See case summary of Ross,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 18 (1988).
3 People v. Morgan, 142 11l.2d 410,470,568 N.E.2d 755,778 (Ill.
1991).
4 Id., 568 N.E.2d at 779. Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court
has emphasized that its decision in Morgan was not a ban on reverse-
Witherspoon questioning, but a recognition that other procedures can
work to ensure the same fairness. People v. Jackson, 145 Ill.2d 43, 110,
582 N.E.2d 125, 126 (Ill. 1991).
5 Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2235 (1992).
6 Id. at 2232-33.
7 Id. at 2230.
penalty would fail to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors as
required by Illinois law and thus act"lawlessly" under the statute. 6 Thus,
to ensure the impartiality of the jurors and the meaningful use of
Morgan's challenges for cause, the Court held that jurors should have
been questioned on their ability to consider all the evidence before
imposing the death penalty.
7
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Source of the Right
In a six to three decision written by Justice White, the Court strongly
reaffirmed a defendant's right to an impartial jury at both the guilt and
sentencing phases of the trial.8 In the context of capital sentencing, the
right may require that a juror be excused for cause because of his or her
views on capital punishment. The Court noted, for example, that it
previously had held such dismissal can occur when a "juror's views
would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as
a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' 9 Therefore, a
juror who would never vote for capital punishment is not impartial and
must be removed for cause. Similarly, the Court reasoned, a juror who
would vote automatically to impose death would also have to be
removed, because such ajuror already has made up his or her mind on the
merits, thereby making the statutory scheme of considering aggravating
and mitigating factors irrelevant. Indeed, the Court found that if even one
such juror should make it onto ajury panel that subsequently imposed the
death sentence, the State would be "disentitled to execute the sen-
tence." 10 Virginia practitioners will want to note the Court's strong
language in support of the impartiality of jurors. Such language will
provide ample foundation for a forceful memorandum of law in support
of reverse-Witherspoon questioning (see discussion below).
Reviewing Witherspoon (limiting a state's power to exclude all
jurors hesitant to impose death), Witt (allowing the state to excludejurors
whose views would impair their ability to follow instructions) and
Lockhart v. McCreelI (allowing the state to identify jurors whose views
would impair their ability to follow instructions), the Court once again
stressed that it is through questioning that the impartial juror is discov-
ered. While the cases cited above deal largely with prosecutorial ques-
tioning, the Morgan Court extended such language to the defense. The
Court recognized that the defendant also has challenges to ensure
impartiality and that if a defendant were not able to question in order to
discover those jurors "who would always impose death after conviction,
his right not to be tried by such jurors would be rendered.., nugatory."12
In sum, the Court concluded that "the extremes must be eliminated."
13
8 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees ajury trial in all state criminal cases that, if tried
in federal court, would come under the Sixth Amendment provisions for
jury trial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); and Turner v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 466 (1965) (impartiality required of any jury under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
9 Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 424 (1985)).
10 Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2230.
11 476 U.S. 162 (1978).
12 Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2232.
13 Id. at 2232, n.7 (citing Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573,578 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
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H. The Scope of the Right and Sufficiency of
General Questioning
In Morgan, Illinois had relied on the general fairness and"following
the law" questions as being sufficient to determine the impartiality of
jurors. 14 Illinois also tried to argue that, in light of the unanimous verdict
requirement to impose death, the impact of seating a juror who would
always vote for death would be slight. 15
In response, the majority emphasized that the State's own requests
under Witherspoon and Witt belied the sufficiency of general question-
ing. After all, the State's Witherspoon questions also would be superflu-
ous if general questions could ferret out jurors unable to perform their
duties impartially. More importantly, the Court stressed that because
jurors may not understand what capital sentencing requires, they might
affirmatively answer that they could obey the law without being aware
of their misconceptions about the law or the impact of their beliefs
regarding capital punishment. The possibility ofjurors believing they are
answering honestly that they can follow the law, when in fact they could
not, would seem particularly true when it came to considering certain
evidence as mitigating and the ability to weigh aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors.
Morgan, for example, would appear to require that courts allow voir
dire of each juror's ability to consider particular mitigating factors. More
than simply allowing the question, "Would you always impose the death
penalty?," defense attorneys should pursue fact-specific questions about
whether each juror would be "substantially impaired" from considering
each piece of mitigating evidence that the defendant intends to iitroduce.
Arguably, then, if a venire person stated that he or she could not, for
example, consider a defendant's "abusive childhood" or an "inability to
conform one's actions" as mitigating evidence, he or she could not sit on
the jury.
Parole is another area rife with jury misconceptions that Morgan
might give defense counsel a chance to examine. In their article Deathly
Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of
the Death Penalty,16 Paduano and Smith report research which found
that the typical juror understands a "life" sentence to be more of a "get
out of jail free card" than a punishment. Further, believing that the
defendant will never actually be put to death, the jurors feel that a death
penalty would at least ensure some adequate jail time before appellate
reversal of the conviction. In addition to the general findings, the
Paduano/Smith article also provides startling statistics that would make
14 People v. Morgan, 142 111.2d at 470, 568 N.E.2d at 778.
15 Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2232, n.8 ("'Persons automatically for the
death penalty would still need to persuade the remaining jurors to vote
for the death penalty."') (quoting Brief for Respondent at 27) (emphasis
in original). Justice Scalia championed this argument in his dissent.
16 Paduano and Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions
Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 211 (Spring 1987).
17 Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41,286 S.E.2d 172 (1972).
18 In his dissent, Justice Scalia applauded the use of the general
"ability to follow the law" questioning found by the majority to be
insufficient. He also discounted the impact of any juror who will fail in
good faith to consider mitigating factors, selecting instead death. Fi-
nally, he speculated on what he sees as the far-reaching and adverse
effects of the majority's decision. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2241 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
19 Id. at 2237, n.2.
20 Id. at 2237, n.3 (emphasis in original).
persuasive additions to a memorandum of law on juror misperceptions
regarding parole. For instance, the authors cite one study showing that
75 percent of registered voters (the jury pool) questioned felt that a death
sentence would be reversed upon appeal. Nearly 70 percent felt it was
unlikely that a person sentenced to death would ever actually be ex-
ecuted. Finally, the majority of those questioned thought the average
person sentenced to life imprisionment for murder would only serve
seven years. While currently Virginia restricts arguments or evidence on
parole, 17 the Paduano/Smith article and the Morgan Court's emphasis
on exploring juror misperceptions may open opportunities for question-
ing jurors about their understanding of parole.
Although Justice Scalia strongly dissented on avariety of grounds,
18
his dissent may actually help form the argument for an expansive use of
Morgan. For instance, Justice Scalia found as a logical consequence of
the majority opinion that the Court in the future must "implicitly
establish[] that the jurors must find some mitigation." 19 Further, from
Justice Scalia's statement that "it is impossible in principle to distinguish
between a juror who does not believe that any factor can be mitigating
from one who believes that a particular fact... is not mitigating,"
20 it
could be concluded that any juror who finds one of the mitigating factors
unacceptable or unusable would have to be excluded. Finally, Justice
Scalia's interpretation of the majority opinion on the subject of mercy
may provide some compelling quotes for defense counsel wanting to
argue a broad interpretation of Morgan.
2 1
After Morgan, voir dire on the reverse-Witherspoon (or life quali-
fying) questions of a juror's inability to consider a life sentence is
constitutionally required upon request. While the Morgan court seems
to expand the range of subjects open to defense questioning, actual
practice and additional case law will clarify those points. Virginia
attorneys may want to approach voir dire armed with a memorandum of
law based on Morgan. Once prepared, attorneys will want to ask reverse-
Witherspoon questions of the jury, presenting the memo when stopped.
Such questions may maintain the form of otherjury questions,2 2 adding,
however, the relevant mitigating factors for the defendant in the particu-
lar case. Adequate voir dire is part of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process,
and where there is any potential of misperception and a vital interest at
stake, defendant's counsel must be given permission to pursue it.
Summary and analysis by:
Roberta F. Green
21 Id. at 2241 ("The Court has, in effect, now added the new rule
that no merciless jurors can sit"); Id. at 2242 ("[The People... cannot
decree the death penalty, absolutely and categorically, for any criminal
act, even (presumably) genocide; the jury must always be given the
option of extending mercy .... Not only must mercy be allowed, but now
only the merciful may be permitted to sit in judgment") (emphasis in
original).
22 Although questions phrased as "Do you personally believe...
, "As you sit there today, do you feel you could ... " and "The job of
determining . . . " were once reserved for investigating attitudes on
witness credibility and the criminal justice system, after Morgan they
become available for reverse-Witherspoon questioning. For instance, a
defense attorney might ask, "Do you personally believe that emotional
disturbance can serve as a mitigating factor to a violent crime?" "As you
sit there today, do you feel you could impose a death sentence on a
defendant with no significant history of prior criminal activity?"
